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Summary findings
In a road infrastructure concession, a public authority  risk. And the commercial risk is sometimes too great to
grants specific rights to a private or semi-public company  be carried by the concession company alone. Commercial
to construct, overhaul, maintain, and operate  risk should be controlled by mechanisms incorporated  in
infrastructure for a given period. By contract, the public  the contract, but control of the commercial risk must not
authority charges that company with making the  eliminate incentives.
investments needed to create the service at its own cost  In addition to safeguarding the community's interests,
and to operate it at its own risk. The price paid to the  the public concession authority must increase citizen
company comes from the service's users, the public  awareness about concession decisions, to ensure their
authority, or both.  social acceptability.
In 1999, out of roughly 51,000 kilometers of  Formulas for determining toll charges differ through
European motorways, about  17,000 kilometers (33  Europe. So do criteria for selecting concession
percent) were concessioned-16,400  kilometers by toll  companies. In 1999, the main criteria used were these:
and 670 kilometers by shadow toll (design, build,  * The amount of public subsidy required.
finance, and operate arrangements). Of these, 73 percent  *  The credibility of the financial arrangements.
are managed by the public sector and 27 percent by  *  The project's technical quality.
private companies. State-owned companies have been  *  The operating strategy and price policy.
important  in European motorway concessions.  *  The reputation of the concession company (whether
Systems vary among countries, for example, in how  it has a construction company among its shareholders,
they share risks between the concession authority and the  for example).
concession company. As the motorway network has  The increasingly frequent use of private funding must
grown denser, attributing commercial risk has become  be taken into account when defining the training
more difficult. Increasingly, public authorities must play  required by personnel responsible for monitoring  the
a greater regulatory role. Already, bad experiences have  concessions.
made the private sector reluctant to bear the commercial
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This part of the report reviews  road infrastructure  concession  practices  in Europe
The purpose  is not  to analyse  the  subject  from  a purely  legal  point  of view,  but  to review  the
experience  with concessions  in the road  sector  in light of examples  of public  authorities
acting  as concession  authorities.
A concession  is generally  identified  as a system  by which  a public authority  grants
specific  rights  to an organization  (whether  private  or semi-public)  to construct,  overhaul,
maintain  and operate  an infrastructure  for a given  period. This corresponds  to a contract,
under  the  terms  of which  a public  authority  charges  a company  with  making  the investments
required  to create  the  service  at its  own cost and operated  the service  at its own risk. The
company  is remunerated  in the form  of a price  paid  by the users  of the service  and/or  the
public  authority.
Direct  payment  by the user  (in the  form  of a toll) is used  by one group  of countries
(Austria,  Denmark,  Spain,  France,  Greece,  Italy,  Norway  and Portugal).  Payment  by the
public  authority  is practised  in Great  Britain,  Finland  and  the Netherlands  under  the name
"shadow  toll" or DBFO (Design,  Build, Finance  and Operate),  where the Government
remunerates  the concession  company,  principally  on the basis  of the  traffic  observed  on the
motorway.  Portugal  and  Greece  are  also  currently  considering  the utilisation  of this  system.
Two criteria  appear  to be intrinsically  linked  to concessions:
. transfer  of  responsibility (risk)  from  the  concession authority to  the
concession  company. The latter must thus be responsible  for managing  the
operation  of the motorway;
. notion  of contract  globality Part of a concession  relates  to the "operation  of
the infrastructure",  which is subject  to remuneration. Whereas  a work contract
merely concerns a  construction task,  a  concession contract consequently
involves both responsibility  for  a  construction programme,  and  a  long-term
service  as indicated  in the following  table (this does not exclude  sub-contracting
all or part of the operation  of the infrastructure  by the concession  company).
A second  approach  to concession  arrangements  is frequently  mentioned. In this
case  the concession  system  is defined  as a tool used  to set up an autonomous  legal
vehicle  and  establish  a certain  competitive  situation  where  one  does  not  already  exist
(or is difficult  to institute)  for the same  contract. In this sense,  a concession  does not
necessarily  involve  the participation  of a private  enterprise,  and can be accorded  to a state-
owned  entity. We revert  to this  point  in  section  1.3.4.
3Principal  differences  between  a concession  and a work contract
CONCESSION  WORK CONTRACT
Multi-purpose:  responsible,for  construction  Single  objective:  construction
programme  and provision  of longerm service
Duration:  long  (mean  = 30 years)  X  Duration:  short
Funding:  concession  company  Funding:  no  interim  funding,  co-funding  or funding
of infrastructure  by contractor
Concession  company  investment  No investmnent  by  contractor
Long-term  occupation  of 'public  domainti  No long-term  occupation  of public  domain
Some  freedom  concerning  design  of  No  freedom  (or only  limited  freedom)  in design
infrastructure  of infrastructure
Sources:  SNBATI  report  -Summary  of  prime  contractor  forum:  Global  construction  contracts  in  Europe,  1997.
Replies  to DERDNVERD  questionnaire  on  concessions
An infrastructure  concession is defined as a contract under the terms of which a
public authority accords specific rights  to a company  to construct, maintain  and/or operate a
network for a  given period. The following types of  contracts are similar in nature to  a
concession:
. BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer): a  company funds, constructs, owns  and
operates an infrastructure  for a limited period (approximately  30 years), at the end of
which the infrastructure  is transferred  at no charge  to the concession  authority.
B  BTO  (Build,  Transfer  and  Operate): a  company  funds  and  constructs  an
infrastructure,  but transfers ownership to the concession authority immediately after
completion  of the construction  phase. Then the infrastructure  is put at the company's
disposal by the government  and is operate  for a limited  period, at the end of which all
rights are restored  to the concession  authority.
BOO (Build,  Own and Operate):  a company  funds and constructs  an infrastructure,
which it owns and operates  for an unlimited period. A variation  of this is the BOOT
(Build, Own, Operate  and Transfer)  contract.
Lease contract:  this differs from a conventional  concession in that the infrastructure
necessary  for operation  of the service is not constructed  by the operator (lessee), but
made available to the latter by the public authority,  who is generally responsible for
funding the project. The lessee, who thus has exclusive responsibility  for operating
the service, obtains remuneration  from users, paying a fee to the public authority
designed  to contribute  to the amortisation  of that authority's  investments.
4Thus,  in the case  of a concession,  and in  contrast  to a simple  management  contract,
the concession  company selected  by the concession  authority  bears the cost of the
investment  and some part of the risk.  This is discussed  in detail in section 11.6.  The
following  diagram  offers  a simplified  illustration  of the difference  between  a management
contract  and  a concession.
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The  following  table illustrates  concession  system  practices  in the road  sector  in
western  Europe. Of a total of 51,242  km of motorways,  17,009  km are concessioned
(33%),  of which  16,356  km are  toll  roads  and  653  km  have  shadow  tolls.
Practice of Highway Concession in Europe in 1998
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51.1  TOLL CONCESSIONS
In countries such as Austria, Spain, France, Greece, Italy and Portugal,  a
concession  is associated  with  direct  payment  by  the user  in the  form  of a toll. Also in  this
context,  Denmark  has used toll concessions  for two crossings:  the "Great Belt", which
comprises  two bridges  with a total length  of 18 km, opened  on 14 June 1998,  and the
Oresund  crossing,  combining  a bridge  and  tunnel  with  a total length  of 16 km,  scheduled  to
enter service  in 2000.  There  are also 26 toll companies  in Norway'  which are not,
however,  concession  companies  in the conventional  sense of the term, since they are
exclusively responsible  for  the collection  of  user payments.  The  Norwegian road
administration  is responsible  for  the  design,  construction  and  maintenance  of toll projects.
1.1.1  Toll  system  advantages  and  disadvantages
Toll systems  are in widespread  use in eight European  countries in inter-
urban  contexts,  whether  for roads,  bridges  or  tunnels. These  are Austria,  Denmark,
Spain, France,  Greece,  Italy,  Norway  and Portugal. The advantages  of toll systems,  as
reported  by European  road  administrations,  can be classed  in three categories.
The first advantage  of a toll system  is that investments  can be augmented. In
numerous  European  countries,  toll systems are increasingly  recognised  as the most
efficient  means  of replacing  taxpayer  money  with user money. The introduction  of a toll
system makes it possible  to commission  earlier than would have been possible with
national  funding. From 1973 to 1995,  state  budget contributions  to the French  national
road system  dropped  from 56%  to 22%,  while toll revenue  increased  from 32% to 57%
during  the same period. In Norway,  toll revenue  represents  32% of the state budget
for the national  road  system 2. The  equivalent  figure  for Spain  is around  46%3.
The second  advantage  of a toll system  is that it serves  as an application  of the
user-payer principle.  In its recent white paper 4 entitled "Equitable fees  for the
utilisation  of infrastructures:  a staged  approach  for establishing  a common  framework  for
transport infrastructure  charges in the European Union", the European  Commission
indicated that  fees  should be  linked directly to  the  costs that  users impose on
infrastructures  and on other citizens,  including  the effects  on the environment  and other
external  impacts  caused by users. In this document,  the Commission  sets out its vision
of future changes  to transport  charges  in Europe,  particularly  in the road  sector. In the
three proposed  phases (see box), the EC recommends  a move toward  distance-based
road  charges,  which  will probably  become  generalised  in Europe.
EC proposals  iregarding  the  6establishmentof  roadinfrastructure  charges
During  the initial phase (1998-200), Member  Sttes wll  be encouraged  to harmonise  or
adopt  compatible  roadqchargen  sstems  fnorheavy  goods  vehicles,  ;either  by means  of
X Over 100 road projects are tolled (mostly bridges and tunnels over and under the Norwegian Fjords).
2 1993  toll revenues totaled NKr 1,500 million, compared to state budget expenditures of NKr4,700 million.
3  1996  toll revenues equaled Pta 144 billion, compared with a state budget figure of Pta 310 billion.
4 COM (98)466 final dated 22 July 1998.
6existing systems'based on tolls, the European  road tax ("Eurovignette"), or preferably, bs
introducing distancebased tees related more closely5'to  costs.  The Commission takes
the  view  that  aJ or substantial number of  Member Statres,  this  type of  system wil
advantageously replace  systems involving, no user fee or time-elated user fees and wil
contribute  to  the  generalisation of  distance-related fees  throughout  Europe.  The
Commission wiil  also draft a, proposal concerning the environmental classification- oi
heavy goods vehicles, in  order to  facilitate -the introduction of fees that  more closel
reflect the environmental rimpacts stemming  from their utillsition.
Member States are encouraged to develop urban road charge systems that account for
the external costs of urban transport, including those  'associated with traffic congestion.
It would not be appropriate.for these systems 'to be organised at the EC level, but th
'Commission  will  continue, to fund  :research -and development,  projects connected with
urban road charges.  To remove potential obstacles, any EC legislation liable to imped
the impnlementation  of these measures  should be revised.
During the second phase (2001-2004),  distance-related fees,  are extended to  include
external as well as infrastructure-related costs, The application  of these fees in new road
concessions  makes  it possible  to introduce  a charge  system  that guarantees  cost recovery,  fo
new investments.  Efforts should also,  be made to promote  the implementation  of urban roa
charge  systems  that are  compatible  with  the charges  forrto  heavy  goods  vehicles.
During the third phase (after 2004), the common system becomes mandatory. For both
heavy goods vehicles and commercial-  passenger  transport, existing charge systems are
replaced  by  harmonised fees' based  on  marginal  cost  and ,founded  on  various
instruments including tolls and use'r  fees.
Source:  European  Commission  white  paper  COM  (98)466  final  dated  22  July  1998:  "Equitable  fees  for the
utilisation  of infrastructures:  a staged  approach  for establishing  a common  framework  for transport
infrastructure  charges  in  the  European  Union".
A toll  system  also  makes it possible  to  arbitrate  between maintenance  and
investment.  For example, in Italy and  France, 27% and 25%  of  toll  resources are
respectively  allocated to maintenance  and operation,  as illustrated  in the figure below.  A
toll  system  therefore  makes it  possible  to  fund  road maintenance,  an frequently
neglected aspect when conventional funding arrangements are established.
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7In this respect, it is appropriate to emphasise the "Norwegian exception", since the
Norwegian road  authority delegates  responsibility for  an  infrastructure to  an  ad  hoc
company collecting toll revenues from users,  where that revenue is not used solely to fund
work on the concession section, but also provides funding for adjacent roads or public
transport.  In Norway the location where toll revenue is collected can differ from that
of the infrastructure  to be funded 5.
In terms of advantages, it should also be noted that a toll system complies with
the principle of territoriality, since users of the infrastructure pay for its utilisation
without differentiation according  to nationality. 6
Furthermore, a toll system can serve to optimise utilisation of the transport
network (traffic spread, inter-modal  sharing of traffic load, etc.). In this case however,
charge systems must meet a number of different and sometimes contradictory objectives
(marginal cost charging, cost recovery, maximised  profit, etc.).
Toll system disadvantages
Apart from problems of acceptability (see below), it should also be noted that
the introduction  of a toll system generally results in reduced socio-economic return
for  the  project  (except  when  there  is  a  congestion  problem) since  a  certain
proportion of users are dissuaded from continued utilisation of the infrastructure. 7
Furthermore, the introduction of a toll system for  an infrastructure induces additional
costs related to the construction, maintenance and operation of toll collection facilities.
For  example, it is estimated that an average of about 10% of revenue is absorbed by toll
collection.  The frequently quoted problem of a toll system, which in more general terms
raises the  question of the  application of a revenue source, could also be mentioned.
Application of  revenue frequently escapes any form  of  democratic control, and  also
represents an obstacle to the optimised distribution of funding resources.  This can lead
to a situation where financial (e.g. through backing by collateral)feasibility is emphasised
to the detriment of the public interest.
Application of toll revenue in Europe
Toll  revenue  from  European  motorway  infrastructures  is  substantial  and
represented about E 8.6 billion in 1996, as shown in the following table.
5 For  example,  in the case  of Oslo  the toll is coliected  where  the ring-road  is crossed  and is used  to fund
adjacent  tunnels.
6 See  Council  directive  93-89  of 25/10/1993  which  establishes  the legal  basis  for toll collection  and  utilization
rights  at  the  EC  level,  replaced  with  directive  99/62  of 17/06/1999
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It is nevertheless  necessary  to put  these amounts  in a proper  perspective,  insofar
as they are substantially  below  actual needs,  and only constitute  a minority  proportion  of
road investments.
In an EC context,  reference  should  be made  to directive  99162  (previously  93/89),
which established  a framework  for rules concerning  vehicle taxes, as well as tolls and
fees for heavy goods vehicles exceeding  twelve tonnes.  Fees (other than tolls)are
capped . Article 7.9 of the directive establishes  that "toll rates are linked to the
construction,  operating  and  development  costs of  the  infrastructure  network
concerned."  However, directive 93/89 merely defines the principle for  toll  revenue
calculation  and  contains  no  pointers  regarding  its  eventual  application.
1.  1.2  Toll  system  functions
A distinction  must  be made  between  the different  functions  of a toll system.
These principally  concern  funding  and channelling  of demand,  functions  which in
themselves  can be  contradictory.
An  analysis of the replies to the questionnaire  issued to  all European road
administrations  shows that toll systems  in all European  countries,  apart from the
Netherlands,  provide  funding for the construction  and maintenance  of the road
infrastructure  in an inter-urban  context,  but  do not have  a traffic  regulation  function.
In the Netherlands,  the toll system  is designed  to direct  road  users  toward  other  means  of
transport. This means  that the primary  objective  in this country  is to control road user
behaviour,  firstly  in order  to ease  road  traffic conditions,  and secondly  to encourage  the
use of means  of transport  such as the railways  and inland  waterways. Norway  recently
decided  to allocate  part of toll revenue  collected  in Oslo and Trondheim  to fund public
transport  and  cycle  lanes. These  experiments  are limited  to the urban  context.
1.1.3  Acceptability  of toll  systems  in Europe
9The problem  of the social  acceptability  of toll systems  must  be examined  with care
whenever  an infrastructure  is to be placed  under toll.  The replies received  from the
European  road  administrations  indicate  that the acceptability  of a toll system  in an inter-
urban  context  is, in practice,  mainly  dependent  on five  factors:
a. Toll charges
Toll charges  vary throughout  Europe  because  they are linked to both the socio-
economic  conditions  in the countries  concerned,  and the extent of construction  work
required  for the concession  infrastructure. Toll charges  for private vehicles for open
country  sections  vary from about  E0.05/km in Italy  down  to less  than  -0.02/km  in Greece
and average about E  0.06/km in France and Spain (since the law of 30/12/1996).
Generally,  heavy goods  vehicle toll charges are two to three times higher than
those for private cars.  We should  not consider  an identical  mean toll level for all
segments  of transport  demand  alone,  since  a toll system  can be adopted  where  charges
depend  on the degree  of usefulness  to the user. Furthermore,  reasoning  along  these  lines
leads  to higher  toll rates  for long  distances  (for  which  the degree  of elasticity  is generally
lower  than  for short  distances).
b. Toll collection  methods
Toll collection  methods  have  an influence  on the degree  of acceptability  of
the toll by  the user. Regarding  electronic  toll collection,  the principal  technologies  under
consideration  in Europe  are either  dedicated  short-range  systems  where  an on-board  unit
communicates  with equipment installed at the roadside or  satellite positioning  and
navigation  systems  and GSM,  where  the on-board  unit communicates  with a satellite. In
both cases, care should be taken to ensure that the user recognises  the service
provided  by the electronic  collection  system,  and that the cost of the toll and the
technology applied do not create additional difficulties  compared to  manual
collection  (particularly  with  the constraints  associated  with the protection  of privacy).
The progressive  introduction  of electronic  toll collection  is also  a factor  that
impacts  user  acceptability  of a toll  system.  The  generalised,  simultaneous  introduction
of a toll system  on a complete  network  represents  a major  political  risk. In this case,  any
malfunction, whether technical (system failure) or  "managerial" (commercial and
management  errors affecting user accounts)  would have an insurmountable  negative
impact on the acceptability  of the network toll system.  From this  point of view,
progressive  introduction,  with the initial  selection  of certain  infrastructures  and/or user
categories,  substantially  reduces  this risk. It should  also be noted  that the introduction  of
a toll system  for a road  infrastructure  can only be considered  on the basis  of an electronic
toll collection  system  in certain  countries. This is the case in Germany,  where it is not
possible  to construct  toll stations  due to high motorway  density  and the fact that most
motorways  transit  via densely  populated  areas,  with the consequent  necessity  of using
automatic  payment  systems  for toll collection  from  the  outset.
The recommendations  of the European Commission  regarding electronic toll
collection  in Europe  is perceived  as one of the best  solutions  to the problems  of charging
road  users.  All Member  States  are encouraged  to move  toward  this, as summarised  in the
following  box.
10EC recommendations  concerning  electronic  toll collection  in Europe
The main priority  for the European  Commission  is the selection  of a charge  system  for
heavy goods vehicles,  since this sector is clearly international  in nature  and its traffic is
extremely  important  to the development  of the single market. The establishment  of an EC
system for  heavy goods vehicle charges will represent  a  major step forward in the
implementation  of the proposed  charging  principles. The system  should  be designed  to be
compatible with systems for  urban road charges established by  municipal and  regional
authorities. The introduction  of an electronic  toll collection  system  for trucks  can thus be
regarded  as the entirely  logical  sequel  to the current  system  based  on the "Eurovignette".
To promote  this change, it will be necessary  for EC legislation  to include a standard
electronic  toll collection option, which will require an in-depth analysis of technical and
harmonisation  aspects,  as  well as administrative  questions.
Souirce:  European  Commission  white  paper  COM  (98)466  final  dated  22 July 1998
c.  The toli system: the necessary counterpart of a user service which must be recognised
by the user
A toll  system is only accepted insofar as it is associated with a satisfactory
advantage  to the user.  In this sense, the acceptability of a funding source toll system
in  an  inter-urban  context  is globally  greater  than  that  for  decongestion  and  traffic
management type toll systems, the usefulness of which  is less easily perceptible by
road  users,  and  is  even  regarded  as  paradoxical  since  charges  are  inversely
proportional to the quality of service.  Information, and its communication to users,
naturally  has a direct impact on the acceptability of a toll system, as illustrated by
France's experience, described in the box below.
Experience with modulation of motorway toll charges in France
Various  types of toll charge  modulation  have been  tried on the French  motorways,  with the goa
of regulating  traffic flow by means  of the toll system.  Results  have generally  been encouraging
Distinction  can be made between  two categories  of modulation:
Time modulation,  where the principle  is to adjust toll rates by time segment, in order to car
peak  traffic levels and spread  returning  weekend  traffic. SANEF  introduced  two "green"  periods
(totls reduced  by 25%) and one "red" period  (tolls increased  by 25%) on motorway  Al  in April
1992. With a toll difference  of 50% between  peak and off-peak  periods,  approximately  10% o
motorists  who previously  used the motorway  in the peak periods  have altered  their travel times
(corresponding  to  an average of 2,000 vehicles per day for the "red" toll period).  Othe
experiments  are being conducted  by AREA in the Rh6ne-Alpes  region, and  COFIROUTE  on
motorways  Al 0 and  Al 1. The results  of these  experiments  are  regarded  as positive  (8%  to 1  0/
|  of peak traffic  has  been shifted,  on the basis  of a 60% peaktoff-peak  toll variance).
Space modulation  is also aimed at capping peak traffic levels on certain motorways,  by re
{routing  outward  and returning  holiday  and weekend  traffic onto alternative  roads subject to tol
reductions,  and increasing  the toll on the saturated  motorway. This type of space modulatior
has been applied  by SANEF  and SAPRR  on motorways  A1-A26 and A5-A6,  and has produced
satisfactory  results  (approximately  10%  shift).
Conclusion: The aim of these experiments  was to achieve  a neutral net impact on revenu
(offsetting  toll reductions  by increases). It was found that the most decisive  factor in the
11modification of  road user behaviour was communication,  followed by  toll  charg
modulation.
Source:  French  Directorate  of  Roads,  1998.
d.  Eventual  presence  of toll-free  itineraries
The presence of a toll-free itinerary parallel to a section under toll  has a
significant  modifying impact on toll  system acceptability.  A number  of countries
have  opted  for DBFO  (Design,  Build,  Finance  and Operate)  type systems  with "shadow"
tolls, particularly  in cases where there is no alternative  toll-free route. Where such a
toll-free route exists, it  is important for the public authority to  ensure that the
tolled sections present a genuine advantage for the user (time savings, increased
comfort and safety, etc.).  Any modification or improvement of alternative routes
must be examined in such a way that the toll acceptance of the user is not placed
in doubt.  The increasing  mesh density of motorway  systems in countries with toll
systems  also induces  difficulties  in  this context.
e.  The existence  of taxes associated  with the road sector has a major impact  on the
acceptability  of a toll system
The acceptability of toll  systems on the Great Belt and  Orensud links  in
Denmark is satisfactory, since both of these road sections provide alternatives to
ferries.  Nevertheless,  there are no current  plans  to place  other road  sections  under  toll in
Denmark. Given  the high level of vehicle  and motor  spirit  taxes,  the acceptability  of toll
systems  is generally  low. The acceptance  of toll systems in Finland is generally low
for the same reasons. This argument  also predominates  in the US, where road users
are fully  aware  that motor  spirit  taxes  are  allocated  to the Highway  Trust Fund.
Inter-urban  tolls  in  Norway  are  relatively  well  accepted,  since  they
significantly contribute to reducing transit time for private vehicles and for  road
carriers.  The situation  is substantially  different in the urban context, where tolls are
regarded  as a new  tax, identical  to those  collected  for  the national  budget. Recent  studies
in Norway  indicate  that while  a majority  of users  are currently  opposed  to toll collection  on
the  periphery  of towns,  this  proportion  is tending  to diminish  with  the passage  of time. 8
In Spain, the acceptability of toll systems is poor at the present time, due to
the  development of a 5,000 km toll-free motorway network ("autovias"),  and the
intention  to extend  the toll-free  motorway  construction  programme  in the  future.
In the  Netherlands, tolls  are  accepted where  applied to  clearly-defined,
limited road sections (bridges and tunnels).  A toll system would probably not be
accepted  for the complete road network.
In France,  toll systems are generally well accepted in the inter-urban context,
being regarded as  a source of  revenue for  the construction,  maintenance and
operation of a good-quality motorway infrastructure network.  On the other hand,
the social acceptability of toll systems in the urban context has induced a number
of difficulties in the last few years (in Lyon  and Toulouse  in particular). It also appears
that the nature of the concession company (state-owned  or private) can have an
impact on toll system acceptability.
121.2 SHADOW  TOLL CONCESSION
1.2.1  Definition
A  shadow toll  contract enables the  public authority to  delegate the
construction  and  funding  of  an infrastructure  to a concession  company.  In this  case,
the concession  company  collects  no toll  from  the users,  for  whom  the infrastructure
is free.  The public authority  remunerates  the  concession  company,  which is
principally  based  on the degree  of utilisation  of the infrastructure.  This  type  of system
consequently  involves  counting  the number  of users and paying  the concession  company
on a pro rata  basis  according  to this  number,  applying  a pre-established  scale. Payment  by
the public authority  takes account  of not only the traffic levels measured,  but also the
performance  of the concession  company. This performance  can be gauged in different
ways,  for example,  according  to the number  of lanes  closed  to traffic  (and time taken  to
execute  repair  work),  or measures  taken  by  the  concession  holder  to increase  road  safety.
1.2.2  Shadow toll  practice in Europe
The DBFO  method  was first introduced  in the United  Kingdom,  but is now also
applied  in Finland,  where the Parliament  has authorised  the application  of a shadow  toll
system  for a 70 km section  between  Jarvenpaa  and Lahti. A shadow  toll system  is also
being examined  in Portugal  (where  toll motorways  are already  in operation)  for  800 km
road  projects.  It was  decided  to adopt  the  shadow  toll method  in Finland  due  to the  existing
high motor spirit and road tax and customs  duties and the level of traffic using the
infrastructure  (regarded  as too  low  to justify  the introduction  of a toll system).
The Netherlands  has adopted  a special  private  project  funding scheme for the
construction  of tunnels  in the western  part of the country. The objective  is to construct  a
larger  number  of tunnels  than would  be possible  using  budget  sources  alone. The "Noord"
tunnel  was the first for which  private  funding  was adopted. This tunnel has extended  an
existing  bridge  link on the second  main route  from Rotterdam  to the Ruhr in Germany.
Preparation  for the "Noord" tunnel was completed  by the Dutch State Public Works
Department prior to the government  decision.  Construction and maintenance are
covered  by the government  departments  on the basis  of a lump-sum  of E  1.4 million  for
maintenance and  operation over  30  years.  This  means that  any  increase in
construction, maintenance  and operating costs is borne by the government.  The
concession  company  provided  the funds, and  as owner  of the tunnel  for thirty years,
will continue  receiving  remuneration  for the investment  according  to the number
of vehicles  using the tunnel and the agreed  tunnel  fee.  The "Noord"  tunnel has
been  in service  since 1992. It should  also  be noted  that concession  systems  are
currently under review in the Netherlands  following  this experiment,  which has
been  criticised  mainly  because  of the excessively  high  transaction  costs involved.
In Spain,  certain  regional  authorities  have  expressed  interest  in this solution.
131.2.3  Advantages  and  disadvantages  of  shadow  tolls
The  advantages  and  disadvantages  of the DBFO/shadow  toll method  can be gauged
in  comparison  with  other  types  of funding,  namely  budgetary  and  toll  concession  funding.
The  advantages  of road  funding  by  means  of a shadow  toll system,  compared
with  toll  concession  funding  are  as follows:
*  there  is no tendency  to shift  traffic  onto  other  roads. In the case  of a motorway
infrastructure  under  toll,  a certain  number  of users  avoid  the motorway  both  because
of the  toll cost,  and  the  distance  between  access  points  (the  mean  distance  between
access  points  in France  is 11 km, although  this rises  to 20 km in open country  and
even more  on certain  new  links  that carry limited  traffic);
. no expenses  associated  with toll collection  are incurred  (it is estimated  that
between  10% and 15% 9of revenue  are absorbed  by toll collection  costs, while
approximately  10%  of the initial  cost of the infrastructure  represents  construction  of
the  toll stations).
The main advantages  of a conventional  toll concession  contract, namely
optimisation  of the infrastructure  with  the risks  and interim  funding  carried  by the
concession  company,  are maintained  with a shadow  toll system. Furthermore,  the
latter  type of system  ensures  that provision  is made  for road  maintenance,  both  in financial
and  personnel  terms. The  spreading  of financial  charges  over  a period  of time makes  it
possible  to attenuate  the constraints  of annual  programming.
Nevertheless,  a shadow  toll  system  does  not  solve  the  funding  problem,  since
the concession  authority  must pay shadow  toll remuneration  to the concession
company  in due course. A shadow  toll contract  does not therefore  generate  new
funding  sources. Such  an arrangement  shifts  responsibility  for the financial  package  onto
the  concession  company  (so  that  the  debt  is non-public),  but  the  final  cost must  be borne  by
the taxpayer  ("delayed"  budgetary  funding)  and not  the user. The  financial  and legal  costs
of this  type of arrangement  can be high,  and  should  not  be underestimated.  By comparison
with budgetary  funding,  the shadow  toll method  also highlights  an apparent  increase  in
financial  expenses  (principally  due  to the  required  return  on invested  capital).
In a recent  evaluation  report on the first DBFO project  phase in the UK 10 , the
National  Audit  Office  emphasised  the  following  points:
*  compared  with  conventional  contract  placement  methods  (budgetary  funding),
two out of four DBFO  projects  produced  major  savings  (30% for the Mi-Al
project, and  25% for Al(M)).  These two  projects include a  substantial
construction  component  (the  other  two principally  involve  maintenance  work);
. the advantage  of the DBFO method is found principally  in the freedom in
design,  which  is left to the concession  company,  the transfer  of risks to the
latter, and the  enhanced efficiency resulting from private management.
14Without these  three conditions, the DBFO  method would have no advantage
over  budgetary funding,  and would cost  more  (more substantial  financial
expenses,  stemming in particular  from  the required  return  on invested capital);
in comparison with a conventional  contract placement method, the DBFO process
requires  more time and involves  much higher  transaction  costs.
British DBFO practice
The British  road system  has  a total length  of 280,136  km, classified  in four categories.  These  arE
motorways,  other  trunk roads (10,384  km),  other  principal  roads  and other  roads. The motorway
and other trunk roads are placed under the direct responsibility  of  the  Ministry (Transpor
Department),  and are managed  by the British  Highway  Agency,  created  in April 1994. Other  road
are  placed  under  county  council  and  municipal  authority.
The government  is partially  disengaging  from  its role  as transport  infrastructure  investment  promoter
in favour of the private  sector,  which is regarded  as more efficient  in this context. Governmen
disengagement  is being  implemented  within  the framework  of the Private  Finance  Initiative  (PFI)
which  provides  for DBFO  concessions  in the road  sector.  The  aim  is to shift  total project  responsibilit
(studies,  funding,  construction  and  operation)  to the private  sector.
Three  work  phases,  representing  fourteen  projects  (forty  operations),  estimated  at £1.1  billion  involv
shadow  toll  arrangements.  Eight  projects  have  already  been  initiated  (580  km).The  Al 3-Thames
Gateway  project  is being  prepared  (having  reached  the pre-qualification  stage  in April 1998). The
initial  phases  for these  projects  were  awarded  in 1996,  and  were  priced  by the British  Nationa
Audit  Office  in  January  1998.
The logic  behind  this  policy  is not essentially  financial.  The goal  is not  to shift  the weight  o
investment  to the user, but rather to oblige contractors  to carry certain risks normally
assumed  by the government,  based  on  the assumption  that a contractor  must  be able  to construc
more  efficiently  and at a lower  cost  than  the public  administration,  and  the fact  that a toll  system  woul
not be  well  received  by the general  public  (there  are  no road  tolls  in the United  Kingdom,  apart  from
number  of tunnels  and  bridges).  The government  remunerates  the concession  company,  in place  o
the user,  on a commercial  basis  according  to a vehicle/mile  rate,  which  assumes  the existence  of e
sophisticated  metering  system.
Also worth mentioning  is the first urban project  for which a shadow  toll contract  is planned:  the
extension  of highway  A13 to the east of London.  This project  amounts  to£ 220 million  (30 year
concession  with  work  scheduled  to commence  in August  1999).
1.3  INITIAL  CONCLUSIONS  CONCERNING  EUROPE'S  ROAD  INFRASTRUCTURE  CONCESSION  APPROACH
151.3.1  Concession  approach  and remuneration  of the concession  company
The first point that emerges  when examining  the various motorway  concession
contracts  set up in Europe is that the toll system is not intrinsically  linked to the
concession  approach. The concession  company  can be remunerated  under  the terms
of a lease  while also applying  incentive  measures.  In this case  the concession  company
collects tolls on behalf of the government,  paying more than the total toll  revenue
collected. This system  involves  a different  form  of risk sharing,  especially  regarding  the
commercial  risk associated  with toll charges  and traffic levels. On the other hand, a
toll system can be operated without a concession,  demonstrated  by the above-
mentioned  Norwegian  examples  where  the operators  are not concession  companies  but
commercial  companies  that operate toll systems through a principally financial role
(construction,  maintenance  and operation  are the responsibility  of the government").
1.3.2  Widely  varying  road  infrastructure  practice  in Europe
The following  table  summarises  the various  concession  methods  applied  in
the road  sector  in Europe,  indicating  the following  for each country:
. experience  in terms  of road  concessions  at both local  and national  levels,
type of concession  contract  used  (user-based  or shadow  toll remuneration),
legal  form of the concession  companies  (state-owned  or private),
*national  legislation  relating  to concessions  (where  this exists),  and
. mean  concession  periods.
16European  highway  concessions  (km in operation,  01-01-98)
Motorway  Motorway network  Concessionaire  companies
network  under concession  public (km)  private kmi)  No. of publicd  No. of private
tiermany  11200  0  0  0  °
3300  580  0  A80  0  3
BAlitrim  2000  180  180  0  1  0
,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  -I-  - - -. 
1800  1,5  1,5  0-  1  0
830  0  0  0  0  0
Spain  8200  2255  405  1850  3  14
394  69  0  69  0  ;
France  8923 a  6705  5905  800.  8
400  75  0  7  0  1
Italy  6500  5600  5420g  180  26  1
LDuxembourg ~  130  0  0  0  0
Norway  550  550e  550  0  26  0
Netbb?rEabu  2300  4  0  4  0  2
Portugal  1422  990  0  990  0  2f
S*0Sedin  ~  1437  0  0  0  0  0
SwlRzeft2lad  1856  0  0  0  0  . 0
TOTAL  51242  17009,5  12461,5  4548  M  63  25
Notes :a. Including  997  km of urban  mototways.
b. Figures  include  two  intemational  tunnel  companies.
c. The  three  public companies  (AUCALSA,  AUDASA  et  AUDENASA)  merged  into a holding: ENAUSA.
d. Public  means: "company  held  at more  than  50%  by the State  and/or  local  collectivities".
e. Norway  has 26 concessionaire  companies  (35  toll roads,  50 km  of tolled  road  belts,  70 km of bridges  and 73  km of
tunnels).  The  term "concession"  is used  although  the  main  role  of the  companies  is to collect  tolls from  road users.
f. The  two  concessionaire  companies  are the  result  of the pnvatization  of BRISA  (966km)  and Lusoponte  (operating  two 24
km  long bridges).
g.Austostrade,  the major  Italian  concessionaire,  has been  privatized  in 2000.
The above table indicates  the total length  of the concessioned  motorway  system
in each country, indicating  whether the concession  companies are private or state-
owned. The ownership  will be more closely  examined  in section  1.3.5,  but the following
figures are noteworthy:  out of 51,242 km of motorway  in Europe,  one-third of the
total  network, 17,009 km, is  under concession,  with  France, Italy and  Spain
accounting  for 86% of the total length of motorway  under concession  (as seen in the
following  graphs).
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1.3.3  Concession  contracts  compared  with  other  infrastructure  funding  systems
The following  diagram  compares  the position  of a concession  contract  with
the other types of funding used in  Europe (national budget, private interim
funding,  etc.), on the basis of two criteria,  payment  by the user or taxpayer, and the
sharing of commercial  risks. The diagram also indicates  the solution adopted in each
country.  Three  conclusions  can be drawn  from  this diagram:
*  the main criteria for an approach  to a road infrastructure  concession  are the
globality  of the contract  and the sharing  of risks  between  the concession  authority
and concession  company;
. payment by the user is not a decisive criterion for qualifying a concession
contract  as such;
*  there is a borderline  zone  (displayed  in pale green)  where no genuine  unanimity
exists concerning  the nature of a concession  contract (example:  shadow toll
arrangement  where  the concession  company's  risks  are substantially  limited).
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Private  Pre-financing.  Private  interim  funding  has the  advantage  of  bringing
forward  the  completion  date  for  the  project.  However,  only  10% of the  budget  can
be  devoted  to  repayment  of  interim  funding,  in  order  to  avoid  overloading  future
operating  periods.  At the  present  time,  twelve  pilot  projects  in Germany,  totalling  E 2.4
billion,  are due to be funded  in this way.1 2
Move toward  the introduction  of private toll  concession  systems  in Germany
The  law of 30108/1994 concerning the private funding of federal highways instituted the
legal framework for private toll concessions for national highways and bridges.  This law
creates the possibility of transferring responsibility for the work (including studies), maintenance,
operation and funding of projects relating to motorways and major national highways to private
investors.  Repayment of the cost of borrowing and operating and maintenance expenses are
then borne directly by the user.  The law only provides for this type of private funding for bridges,
tunnels and mountain passes used by motorways and federal highways, and federal highways
possessing motorway  characteristics (dual carriageways), a  limitation resulting  from  directive
93/89 that prohibits the simultaneous application of road taxes and tolls on a road section.
The first  projects to be implemented under concession contracts'following  the  promulgation of
this law concern the Warnow crossing" 3 in Rostock and the Trave tunnel in Lubeck.  A total of
seventeen priority projects that  represent a  total  length of  283 km  and  an  estimated
amount  ofI3.5  billion could be funded  under the  terms of  private sector  concession
contracts.  There are no  plans to  place the  German  motorways under  toll for  private cars,
although this is planned for heavy goods vehicles at the beginning of the 2000-2010 period.
1.3.4 Principal  merits  of concession  contracts
20Projects  for which  foreseeable  revenue  is insufficient  to guarantee  the remuneration
of  credits can only be  implemented  by  means of  public subsidies.  Furthermore,
govemments  can  borrow  at more  favourable  terms  than  the  private  sector  since  there  is less
risk. A private  company  must  possess  substantial  equity  to undertake  a road  infrastructure
concession  project. However,  equity  funding  is costly  due to the risks involved. It
should  be remembered  that these risks  also exist in a case  where  the government
decides  to fund  infrastructure  projects  from  tax revenue.  Public  money  also  has a cost,
even  if this  cost is usually  hidden.
The advantage  of selecting  a private  company  to construct  and  manage  a road
infrastructure  under  the  terms  of  a concession  contract  is based  on three  factors:
i)  Allocation  of the  funding  source  and  the  globality  of the  concession  contract
Allocation of  the funding source represented  by the toll  system is  an
advantage  frequently  quoted  by the Italian,  Spanish,  Portuguese  and French  road
administrations.  By setting  up a concession  contract,  the govemment  avoids having  to
bear  the construction,  maintenance  and operating  costs  of the infrastructure.  Allocation  of
funding  sources  is made  possible  by the particularly  stable  organisational  framework  of
a  concession.  The following graph showing the  evolution of  operating expenses
(aggregate figures and per kilometre)  over time  indicates that operating expenses
(namely  maintenance  expenses  for pavements  and shoulders,  personnel  expenses  -
including  toll station  staff  - and the various  taxes  associated  with operation)  are equal to
construction  costs after 70 years.  Expressed  in different terms, operating expenses
represent  about 75% of construction  costs after  35 years ( usual  motorway  concession
contract  duration).  This figure  is even  more  important  since  the concession  company  bears
only part of the construction  cost due to the need  for a government  subsidy  to ensure  the
financial  balance  of the  concession  (this  subsidy  applies  to construction  costs).
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years
Source: French  Directorate  of Roads,  1998
Assumptions:  Open  country  motorway;  mean  construction  cost  exdluding  taxes:  35  MFFlkmn  (blue  line);  traffic:10,000  vehicles/day
ii)  Management  efficiency
21When  a  concession system  is  set  up,  it  normally introduces an  efficient
management method. The  concession company is  generally capable  of  designing,
constructing and operating the motorway more efficiently since it is not subject to public
administration  management  constraints.
iii)  Non-public  character  of the debt
Furthermore,  the government  may wish to avoid increasing the public debt. In
the case of a toll concession,  the concession company's debt does not form part of the
public  debt. According  to Eurostat,  this is for a number of reasons (see  box).
Funding  and operation  of "state-owned  infrastructures"  by the private  sector
Eurostat  has  decided  to adopt  a statistical  accounting  procedure  for investment  (capital  expenditure)
by  the private  sector  in  state-owned  infrastructures  (fixed  assets).  Two  cases  can  be identified:
Case 1: public  authorities  call  on a private  company,  to construct  and fund  a fixed asset,  acquiring
ownership  of as it is constructed.  The capital  expenditUre  is recorded  in the opublic  administration
sector. The investment  increases  the government  deficit,  but in fact it has no impact  on the public
debt  as defined  in European  Council  Rule  No.  3605/93.  In order  to meet  convergence  criteria,  public
administration  commitments  to the private  sector  in the form of medium-  and long-term  commercial
credits  recorded  in  the public  administration  account  are  excluded  for measurement  of public  debt.
Case  2: public  authorities  call on a  iprivate  company  to construct  and operate  a fixed  asset  during  its
lifetime,  acquiring  ownership.  The  capital  expenditure  is then  be recorded  in the private  sector,  since
it has  no  effect  on  the  government  deficitqor  public  debt.
Case  1 applies  particularly  to private  sector  construction  and  interim  funding  of roads  in Germany.  At
least  twelve  projects  have  been  initiated  at the  federal  level  since  1995/1996,  along  with  a number  of
projects  at the Landl  and  commun levels.  Funding  for the construction  of a high-speed  rail system  is
similarly  planned. The government  deficit  includes  payments:  due as the work  is completed. The
amounts  involved,  estimated  at DM 4 to 5 billion  in 1997,  represent  only  a small  percentage  of GNP.
The Oresund  bridge  between  Denmark  and Sweden  is an example  of case  2.  Construction  by a
consortium  of state enterprises  owned  by the Danish  and Swedish  Governments  commenced  in
1996. The consortium  is funding  the Operation  by borrowing  on the money  market, under state
guarantee.  After  its  scheduled  0completion  in the  year  2000,  the  consortium  will have  a concession  for
operating  the  bridgeoand  toll  rvnue  willb  ated  to  the  operator.  It is estimated  that  the debt  will
be repaid  by 2026,  at which  time  the consortium  will continue  to operate  the bridge  for an unlimited
time. Capital  expenditure  is  recorded  in the  business  sector, with  no  impact  on  government  deficit.
Some  of the private  finance  initiative  contracts  in the (United  Kingdom  represent  another  example  of
case  2.  Instead  of acquiring  and operating  an asset,  the government  acquires  the services  of a
private  sector  operator.  The  operator  then  acquires  the  asset  in order  to supply  the  services  required.
Capital  expenditure  is recorded  in  the business  sector,  andc  has  no impact  on the government  deficit.
The public  administration  accounts  record  the purchase  of Wervices  supplied  by the operator,  thus
contributing  annually  to the increase  in  the gover  nment  deficit.
Eurostat  confirms  that these  achounting  procedures,  recorded  in the public  administration  accounts  in
Germany,  Denmark,  Sweden  and  the U.K.,  are  correct. In the returns  submitted  twice  yearly  by the
Member  States  to the EC  in  the framework  of the proedure relating  to excessive  government  deficits,
these  amounts  are  considered  in  accordanceiwith'the  abeaccounting  practice.
Source:  Eurostat  press  release  No. 1697,  dated  21 February  1997:  "Accounting  operations.  Latest  Eurostat
decisions  concerning  deficit  and  debt".
221.3.5 Integration of socio-economic  and equity return in connection with the
decision  to set up a concession  contract
A  number of different types of socio-economic  road project analyses can be
identified  in the European  countries,  the two main families  being conventional  cost-
benefit analyses on the  one  hand, and  cost-benefit  analyses combined with
multicriterion  analysis  on the other.  Values  differ  substantially  from one  country  to
another  for the monetary  measurement  of external  effects  (pollution,  greenhouse  effect,
noise, etc.). This also applies to the valuation  of time, an essential  element  of socio-
economic  analysis,  estimated  at 5 Euros/vehicle  hour in Germany,  compared  with 23
Euros/vehicle  hour  in Norway." 4
The establishment  of a road infrastructure  concession  effectively  follows a logic
involving the  socio-economic  return on the project upstream (thus measuring the
advantage  for the community)  and the return on equity  from the operation  downstream.
It is important  to remember  that the benefit  of an investment  for the community  is
regarded  solely  from the economic  return  point  of view. Return  on equity  defines
the conditions  for project  feasibility,  where  the latter can be funded by collecting
a toll from all or some users. However,  return  on equity  cannot  serve as a basis
for  selecting  a state-owned  infrastructure  since:
- this indicator  is from  the viewpoint  of a possible  concession  company  or authority
examining  the conditions  under  which  this option  could  be adopted,  and
- it is based  on terms  of revenue  and expenditure  for the concession  company.
The following  graph summarises  this problem,  identifying  various decisions  that
road administrations  are required  to take when selecting  and funding  a project  (budget,
toll concession,  shadow  toll, etc.). Furthermore,  not  only investment  measures,  but also
in situ development,  traffic, and other transport  management  measures  are taken into
account. 1 5 It thus appears that the feasibility  of a concession  comes down to a
compromise  between  various  sub-optima:
- funding  constraints  limiting  the  possibility  of economically  profitable  investments;
- toll  dissuasion  effect,  which  reduces  the  economic  advantage  of the project;  and
- allocation  of sources,  collected  from  the user rather  than the taxpayer,  leading  to a
preference  for investments  that can be funded  to the detriment  of other solutions,
which  are nevertheless  more  advantageous  for the community  in terms  of economic
balance,  but  which  ensures  their  feasibility.
23As shown in the graph below, any decision relating to the methods of financing a
road project (toll concession, shadow toll concession, etc.) is based on calculation of
discounted earnings, which is the difference between net global benefit and investment
cost. This indicator  measures  the variation  in public utility associated  with the development
scenario, making it possible to judge its intrinsic  interest. This selection  criterion leads to the
adoption of development  scenarios  for which discounted  earnings are positive.
I  SELECTION  PROCESS  OF  A PROJECT  AND  ITS FINANCING
When to launch a concession?
FORECASTING  TOOLS
- trend in  all modes
r  _-  traffic forecast  of passengers /freight
/ transport  and  and planning  policies
CURRENT SITUATION
OUTCOME
- current problems identified on the
network:  congestion, safety,  (situagon  the most probable if no
environment...  significant  decision is taken
- function of the itinerary
Is the outcome socially and
no  technically acceptable?  _  yes
Investment  Optimization  of the existing  Specific  qnd local mesaures
new motorway  or  network
other tye  of  new  Operation policy
*~~~~~~~  >ol>oqnn  anly
SELECTION  OF  THE  PROJECT
FINANCING OPTIONS
Concession  mechanism  |  B  tfinancing  Shadowtoll  system  I
(implemented  at the year  n)  (implem  at the year  n+x
Net Present Value
\  (NPV,)  . Net Present Value  ,  Net Present  Value I,  .,  ~~~~~~  ~~(N  PV,)  (NPV  3
Public subsidy  Si  N
r  2  NPV<o
NPV1 <O  Doe t  esimate  p--i  . .----
ubsidy  S, provide  a return  No project  or modification  of
on equity  acceptable  for the  the  project
n  private  company?  V
No project
or  '  Comparison  of discounted  Decision  on
modification ..- No  Yes-.c  earnings  by  euro  invested  >  the financing
project  (NPV/cost,)  I  method
Notes:  x  represents  the  number  of additional  years  corresponding  to  the  possibility  of  Government  and  local  collectivities'
financing.
NPV  = Net  Present  Value
The  discounted  earnings  by  Euro  invested  is the  ration  between  the  discounted  earnings  and  the  investment  cost.
This  ration  enables  the  prioritization  of  the  various  investment  scenarios,  taking  into  account  the  financial
constraints.
1.3.6  Comparison  of state-owned  and private concession  companies
24In 1999,  there  were 63 state-owned  and 28 private  concession  companies  in
Europe. However,  numerous  companies  have  merged  recently  (including  ASFINAG  in
Austria,  who  acquired  control  of  two  state-owned  concession  companies,
Osterreichischen  Autobahnen  und Schnellstrassen  AG (Ossag),  and Alpenstrassen  AG,
and similar  operations  in Spain, Italy and France).  It is consequently  more significant  to
argue in terms of network  size concessioned  to state-owned  and private companies.
We then find that out of 17,009  km of motorway  under  concession,  12,461 km are
managed  by the public  sector (73%),  and 4,548 km by private  companies  (27%).
The following  table summarises  this for each European  country  with concessions,  both
toll and shadow  toll (note  that all shadow  tolls  are private).
The choice of a state-owned 16 or private company  for a motorway  concession
involves  numerous  factors,  including  return  on equity  and socio-economic  return,  as well
as criteria  that account  for "market  realities",  of which  return  on equity is a component  (a
private  company  will only consider  a project  under  certain  conditions).
The  following  arguments  frequently  conflict:
Firstly, a concession  company  needs not be private to be efficient.  The
government  can create  a separate  entity  with  the status  of a state-owned  company,
keeping  its own accounts  and applying  management  discipline  similar  to that of a
private  company. This entity  borrows  funds,  repaying  them with income  from the
revenue  source. This solution  makes  it possible  to circumvent  state-owned  status
constraints  (see  section  1.3.4  for details)  and achieve  a certain  degree  of efficiency
in the management  of the infrastructure.  A major  difference  between  this solution
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and that involving a concession  contract with a private company, is that the
25government  does not generally  abandon  a state-owned  company  that is having
difficulties, similar to  how it tends to  dip into the  coffers of a  state-owned
company  that generates a surplus. The support of the Government  is also an
important  factor taken into account by the rating agencies  when assessing  the
risks of the project  for the bondholders;  as a result,  most of the concessions  in
the US involve direct participation  of public authorities. However, stand-alone
projects start to emerge and a new set of tools to assess their credit risk has
been developed.
Secondly, it is frequently  suggested  that the management  methods of private
investors (particularly  regarding wages and salaries, and staff recruitment in
financial and legal sectors) are more likely to  achieve efficiency than those
practised in the public sector. Moreover,  the obligation  to use bank credit lines
subjects  the investment  project  to rigorous  audits by the banks  themselves. This
meticulous evaluation of  projects, based  exclusively on  financial  criteria,
contributes  to the enhanced  efficiency  of the private  sector.
In schematic  terms,  we can use two "extreme"  examples  to address  the question  of
concession  contracts  with  state-owned  or private  companies:
1. The first example  concerns  an operation  conducted  at a "low"  return  on equity
(around  2% to 4%), which  could reflect  modest  forecast  traffic levels  and/or high
construction  costs. The choice  of a state-owned  or private  concession  company  is
frequently  replaced  by a choice  made  at an earlier  stage  relating  to the relevance  of
adopting  a concession  contract  and  to the need  to apply  a toll system  to the section
concerned.  We therefore  must  refer  to the three  main  advantages  of a concession
contract  over a simple  work contract  in the concrete  case of the project  (section
1.3.3).
2. On  the other  hand,  we can  consider  a case  where  the  return  on equity  anticipated
from a motorway  concession  contract  is high. Two points  must be examined.
The first concerns  the social acceptability  of a toll system.  The nature  of the
concession  company  (state-owned  or private)  has an impact  on this factor.
The  second  point  is linked  to the  possible  existence  of an undue  benefit  that  is
disproportionate  to the risks  borne  by  the concession  company.  In this  case,  if
the concession  is awarded  to a private  company,  it is important  to limit  payments  to
this company  (while  naturally  allowing  the latter  a level  of profit in proportion  to the
risks  that it bears). This limitation  can be imposed  by capping  the toll revenue
collected  by  the company  or by restricting  the rate  of return  for  the company  (a
good example  of this practice  is the situation  of public utilities  in the UK).  Both
methods  are described  in detail  in the second  part of this report.  Generally,  the
objective  is to be to identify  a state  of equilibrium  or fair distribution  of risks
between  the  concession  authority  and  the  company.
II. KEY  COMPONENTS  OF A ROAD  INFRASTRUCTURE  CONCESSION




- concession award criteria,
- potential  for development  of new ideas  by the concession  company,
- sharing  of risks between  the  concession  authority  and concession  company.
11.1  CONCESSION  LOT  SIZE
The definition  of the "exact"  size of the concession  lot is the responsibility  of the
government. This is a delicate task, as emphasised  by the Portuguese  and French
directorates  of roads in their replies  to the questionnaire. The composition  of each lot
depends,  among other aspects,  on the degree  of competition  expected. Grouping  a
number of motorway  sections together  to offer a substantial  size lot has the
advantage of  reducing management  costs, which are  customarily high for  a
concession.  Management  and transaction  costs must be monitored  with care.
Private  sector involvement  in the funding  of infrastructures  generally  increases  this type
of cost. Furthermore,  an adequate  size  can lead  to enhanced  productivity  on the part  of
the  construction contractors, resulting from optimised utilisation of  the  plant and
equipment.
The size of the concession  lot is also linked  directly  to the backing  mechanism. If
the facility placed  under  concession  is sufficiently  large,  it is then possible  to achieve a
balance  between  profitable  and less  profitable  sections. One  of the difficulties  that is
frequently  encountered  during the preparation  of an infrastructure  concession
contract  is making  the package  sufficiently  interesting  for the private  sector  from
a financial  point of view. This difficulty  was mentioned  by the British  Highway  Agency
and the Spanish  Directorate  of Roads.
Another question  frequently  linked to this problem  of defining  the optimum size
for  concession lots regards land purchase prices buyers.  While it  is  obviously
necessary  to address  this problem  case by case, it can be said that the provision  of
land  to the concession  company  spares the latter the difficulties  of expropriation,
while constituting  a financial  support  that is fairly well accepted by the public.
Intervention by  the concession company nevertheless  induces additional flexibility
during land purchase  negotiations.  In Spain, for example,  the land is expropriated  by
the government. The concession  company that will use the land is responsible  for
paying  the cost of expropriation,  although  the government  retains  ownership  of the land.
Likewise,  in France,  the government  is the owner  of the infrastructure  under  concession
and the concession  company  acts in its name throughout  the concession  period, thus
being able to acquire  land under  the terms of enforceability  attached  to the declaration
of a public utility.  At the end of the concession  period, the complete infrastructure
(including  operating  buildings)  reverts  to the government.
11.2  ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE  CONCESSION  PERIOD
27The  period for an  infrastructure  concession  (covering  construction  and
operation)  is lengthy,  normally  30 years  or more  (the  mean  figure  is 30 years  in the UK,
Portugal,  Italy and the Netherlands,  75 years in Spain  (since  the law of 30/12/96),  and a
minimum  of 15 years in Finland). The concession  period  for state-owned  companies  in
France  has been  based  on the loan  repayment  period. The period  for concession  contracts
with  private  companies  is substantially  longer.
It  is  important to emphasise that a  long concession period secures the
position  of the concession  company,  but involves  an annual payment  risk (see
section on methods  of annual payment  limitation). A balance  must therefore  be
found  and phases  for "renegotiation"  between  the concession  authority  and the
concession  company  must  be  incorporated  into  the concession  framework.
A problem  frequently  associated  with defining  the concession  period  relates  to the
exclusivity  attributed  to the concession  company. As a general  rule,  the concession
contract  accords  exclusive  rights  to the concession  company  for the  execution  of work,  and
the supply  of services  throughout  the period  of the concession.  There can, however,  be
exceptions  to this "rule"  insofar  as the public  authorities  can prefer  to grant  exclusivity  to the
concession  company  for a given  period  which  is less  than  the  total  period  of the concession,
and allow other companies  to enter the market  and compete  with the first concession
company  for the supply  of services.  The aim of the public  authorities  is then  clear:  to guard
against  any  excessively  monopolistic  practices  on  the  part  of the concession  company.  This
practice is frequently  based on other business  sectors,  such as  gas, electricity  and
telecommunications  (where  the concession  primarily  covers  the provision  of services),  and
also rail transport.  Lessons  on the subject of "non-exclusivity"  can nevertheless  be
applicable  to the  road  sector,  particularly  the  area  of road  operating  concessions.
Problems  of long-term  traffic prediction  are difficult  for both the public and private
sectors,  and may  favour  reducing  the length  of motorway  concessions  to around  20 years.
However,  a shorter concession  period requires  a higher rate of remuneration  for the
concession  company,  resulting  in an increase  in tolls or a larger  government  subsidy,  to
reduce  the  socio-economic  return  of the  project  and  the  benefit  for the  community. 8
Although  not  yet practised  by the road  sector  in Europe,  mention  should  be made  of
endogenous  period concessions,  where the period of the  concession  is  not pre-
established,  but  depends  on the  a posteriori  profitability  of the  project.  The public  authorities
set  the amount  of the  toll  charge  and each  candidate  concession  company  responds  with  an
estimated  discounted  revenue  amount  for the  project  in question.  The selected  concession
company  implements  the project  and is conventionally  remunerated  by the users. The
concession  period  ends  when  the discounted  revenue  amount  collected  reaches  the
amount  quoted  by the concession  company  in its bid. This method  has been  applied
for motorway  concessions  in Latin  America. The concession  company  does not have  to
carry  the  sometimes  difficult  to predict  traffic  risk  and  the concession  company  is strongly
encouraged  to reduce  its costs,  since  it has  no possibility  of increasing  the  toll charges. It
8 With the additional  assumption  that an increase  in toll charges  is socially  acceptable,  which is far from
always  being  the  case,  especially  in urban  environments  as pointed  out  in section  1.1.3.
28should be pointed out that the govemment  has no prior indication  of the termination  date for
the concession (with the normal system,  the end of the concession period is always defined
in the initial  contract, but this is frequently  subject  to numerous  extension  amendments).
11.3  DEFINITION  OF TOLL  CHARGES
European  experience  demonstrates  that two cases can be considered,  depending on
whether the road infrastructure  is under  toll or not (shadow  toll method).
11.3.1  Setting  togl charges 9
The  European  countries  operating  toll  systems  are  Austria,  Spain,  France,
Greece, Italy, Norway and Portugal.  Currently, in Portugal and Spain, a maximum toll
charge is specified in the concession contract, but the concession company is free to
reduce this  if necessary.  In  France, toll charges are set  under five-year  contracts.
Despite this lack of real uniformity, we can consider that the most frequently followed
rule links the global evolution of toll charges to the general rise in retail prices (excluding
tobacco).  Charges are revised annually, within + 15% of this evolution rate.  This rule's
legibility is of primary importance where toll charge definition is concerned.
Two methods for limiting  concession  company  annual revenue
Capping  the amount  of toll revenue.  This  method  has been  applied  increasingly  over  the last  ten
years,  due  to the  incentive  it gives  to the-concession  company  to achieve  greater  efficiency.  The  price
practised  by the concession  company  is revised  and adjusted  at approximately  5-year intervals,
according  to the rate  of inflation  plus or minus  a predetermined  amount.  An interesting  compansor
can  be made  to public  utilities  in the U.K.,  where  the price  escalation  and regulation  rule  is expressec
as RPI-X,  where  RPI  is the retail  price  index  and X represents  the estimated  future  efficiency  gain  o
the concession  company.  This method is also applied  in New Zealand  (telecommunications),
Argentina  and a number  of developing  countries  including  Malaysia,  Mexico  and Peru. One of its
drawbacks  is linked  to asymmetric  information  between  the concession  authority  and concession
company  since price  regulation  is based  on the estimated  internal  efficiency  of the company,  data
which  is not  generally  disclosed  by  the  concession  company.
Rate  of return  regulation.  This  method  is used  particularly  in Canada,  the U.S.  and Japan. Public
authonties  set the rate of return  for the concession,  which determines  the price applied by the
concession  company. The price is revised  when the rate return is different  than anticipated
Consequently,  this  embodies  a much  weaker  incentive  factor  for the  concession  company.
It should  be  kept  in mind  that  these  methods  of limiting  concession  company  revenue  induce  differen
risk sharing  between  concession  authority  and concession  company. In particular,  capping  the tol
charges  means  that the latter  has  to bear  greater  risks. If production  or construction  prices  rise,  the
concession  company  cannot  pass  on this  increase.  The  addifional  risk  increases  the cost of capital
necessitating  a higher  rate  of retum  (to satisfy  investors).
Source: "Price  Caps, Rate of Retum Regulation  and the Cost of Capital", Ian Alexander and Timothy Irwin,
Public  Policy  for the Private Sector,  World  Bank.,  September  1996.
9  Toll charges practiced in Europe  are examined in section 1.1.3.a.
29In Italy,  toll regulations  have  changed  substantially  over  the  last  few  years. The main
change  dates  back  to 1992  when  it adopted  (law  498)  a "price  cap"  type formula  for the
adaptation  of motorway  charges,  accounting  for variations  in inflation,  traffic  levels,
productivity  indicators  and the  content of  the business plans of  the  various
concession  companies. 10 The formula established  at  the  meeting of  the  CIPE
(Interministerial  Committee  for Economic  Programming)  on 20/12/1996  was written  into the
new agreement  stipulation  between  ANAS and Autostrade  in August 1997,  and will be
incorporated  in new  contracts  with  the  other  concession  companies.  The  formula  is:
AT￿AP-X+J3AQ
where
*  AT:  applicable  toll charge  adaptation.
*  AP:  programmed  inflation  for  the  year  of application  of the  change.
*  X: expected  productivity  factor (to be determined  for each concession  company,
taking account  of a fair return on capital,  future investment  projects,  expected
modification  of productivity  and  traffic  growth  forecasts).
*  P: positive  coefficient.
*  AQ:  quality  of service  indicator  variation.
Mention  should  also be made  of "intermediate"  methods,  involving  concession  fees,
tax-related  measures,  and  the combination  of the  two methods  described  above. It should
also be emphasised  that recourse  to concession  fees should  be "moderate",  particularly
during the early part of the concession  period, in order to avoid unnecessarily  over-
burdening  the concession  company  during  this  phase. Other  means  of limiting  concession
company  revenue  also  exist.
11.3.2  Remuneration  of  concession  companies on  a  DBFO type  basis - the
interesting  "traffic  band"  concept
In  the  case  of  shadow toll  concessions,  the  concession companies are
remunerated  principally  on the basis of recorded  traffic  levels.  Taking the British
example,  four "traffic  bands"  have  been defined  (see  graph  below),  each with a specific
concession  company  remuneration  rate,  as follows:
*  0 to 70 million  vehicle  km:  9 pence/vehicle  km,
*  70 to 100  million  vehicle  km: 6 p/vehicle  km,
*  100  to 130  million  vehicle  km:  3 p/vehicle  km, and
*  over  130  million  vehicle  km:  zero  remuneration.
Remuneration  of the concession  company  is thus  capped,  as there is no further
payment  ("price  cap"  system)  above  a certain  traffic  level  (130  million  veh.km  in
the example  examined). It should  be noted  that the concession  companies  were free to
establish  their  own  traffic  bands,  and  their  own  remuneration  rates. These  parameters  were
then negotiated  with the Transport  Department. Candidate  concession  companies  had
10  Extract from the AISCAT document: "Motorway  toll charges and price capping in  Italy"  ASFA,
September  1998.
30access  to traffic  data  recorded  on  the  section  in question,  or traffic  predictions  established  by
the  British  Highway  Agency  in  the  case  of new  motorways.
The contract (established  for a period of 30 years) is such that the concession
company is encouraged to carry out motorway repairs efficiently.  Payment by the
public authority accounts  for the traffic levels recorded,  as well as the performance  of
the concession company. Performance  can be measured,  for example, on the basis
of the number  of lanes closed to traffic  (and  the time taken for the repair work), or the
measures  introduced by the concession  company  to improve  road safety.
11.4  CONCESSION  COMPANY  SELECTION  PROCEDURES  AND  CRITERIA
Analysis of  the  replies to  the  questionnaire  issued to  the  European road
administrations  reveals  that numerous  different approaches  are currently employed  for
the awarding of motorway  concessions. The  differences  between  the approaches  lie
in the criteria adopted for the assessment  of bids and the weighing factors applied.
The following  table  summarises  the methods  used  for the award  of concessions  in the four
countries  where  the  approaches  appear  to be  the  most  highly  formalised.
Concession company selection criteria weighting in four European countries (%)
Shadow toll  Toll
United Kingdom  Finland  Spain  Portugal
State  subsidy  35
Coherence  of concession  Criterion:  lowest  NPV'of  payments  90 (for NPV)
company financial plan  to a concession  company  30  70
Investment,  toll charges,
operating costs  25
Completion dates for
execution  of work
Design  4  K
Technical  minimum  required  10  30
(best  nnn(for  technical  10
(best  non-enhanced  solution)  criteria)
Quality  of  IF
servicelmaintenance
Source: Table based on replies to the questionnaire issued to the European road administrations
Note: NPV: Net present  value  for scheduled  payments  by the highway  agency  to the concession  company.
EC legislation  in the contract  award  domain  (see  Appendix)  currently makes the
award of motorway concessions subject to prior publication obligations.  Once
these obligations have been met in accordance with the prescribed procedures,
submitted bids can be freely negotiated.
Among  the most important  criteria  adopted  by the road administrations  are the
amount of subsidy required, the credibility of the financial package, the technical
quantity of the project and the operating  toll charge policy.
Criteria  are not  always  quantified  or quantifiable.  Thus,  in many  countries,  the  award
of a concession  is the result  of a compromise  between  the amount  of the subsidy  required
and  the  dissuasion  effect  of a toll on the  one hand,  and examination  of the reputation  of the
31concession  company  (experience  in the domain,  references,  membership  of a large public
works  engineering  group,  etc.) on the other. This particularly  corresponds  to the case in
France. Public authorities  consequently  attach  particular  importance  to the financial
feasibility  of  the operation  proposed  by the concession  company, also taking
account  of the dissuasion  effect  in favour of non-paying  infrastructures  (but which
are also  less  safe  and  more  highly  pollutive)  over  an  excessively  high  toll charge.
Selection  criteria  must  be clearly  established  wherever  possible. Furthermore,
a renegotiation  between  the government  and the concession  company  must be planned
when signing  the contract,  in order  to reassess  environmental,  political  and traffic-related
constraints.  The  basis  for  this  reappraisal  must  be agreed  at the  outset.
At this point, a  substantial  difference  should be  noted between the award of
conventional  work  contracts  and  concession  contracts:  negotiation  is particularly  important  in
the latter. It should  also  be noted  that the key players  involved  must be taken into
account  when setting up a concession  arrangement. Compared  to a simple work
contract  where the employer  basically  only needs  to concern  itself  with the public works
contractor,  a  concession  contract is a  complex mechanism  where commercial
banking  institutions  and  sometimes  international  organisations  must  be brought  into
the picture  as much  as possible,  from the commencement  of negotiations  (or even
the upstream  studies)  between  the concession  authority  and concession  company,
as indicated  in the  following  diagram.
It is also important  to obtain an adequate  commitment  from the future
concession  company,  for  example,  in the form  of a letter  of agreement  specifying  an
initial bond,  followed  by a "first request  guarantee"  so that the candidate  is genuinely
committed  (when  the actual  project  has progressed  sufficiently  far, the guarantee  becomes
intrinsic  and  equates  to the  funds  committed  to the  operation  itself).
Contractual structure of project financing:
Numerous players to be taken into account from outset
Intemational 







3211.5  CONCESSION  COMPANY  FREEDOM
An analysis  of the  questionnaire  replies  shows  that in contrast  to a work  contract,
that the concession  company  is customarily  allowed  a certain  degree  of freedom  in
the  areas  of design,  execution  of  the  work,  toll  charge  policy  and  level  of service.
Regarding  design,  the  degree  of freedom  allowed  to the concession  company  varies
from  one country  to another  and depends  on the project  itself. For example,  in Spain,  the
concession  company  is responsible  for feasibility  studies,  on the basis of a 1/5,000  scale
preliminary  study  provided  by the road  administration.  Award  of the  concession  is based  on
the  preliminary  design,  after  public  inquiry  and assessment  of environmental  impact,  and  it is
finally the concession  company  who defines  the construction  project.  France has a
relatively  decentralised  procedure.  At the preliminary  design  stage  (precise  motorway  route
study),  the concession  company  is responsible  for  the  geometrical  definition  of the  total land
requirement,  interchanges,  repair  and reopening  of existing  roads  and bridge  studies,  in
collaboration  with elected  representatives,  residents,  local  associations  and administrations.
In the U.K.,  the concept  of concession  company  freedom  is particularly  important. The
advantage  of DBFO  methods  stems  from  the degree  of innovative  freedom  allowed  to the
concession  company,  the transfer  of risks  to the latter,  and the greater  efficiency  resulting
from private  management. In Greece,  the government  hands over the project  to the
concession company upon  completion of  the  preliminary  design study  and  land
expropriation,  passing on the requisite  environmental  and archaeological  authorisation
documents.
Companies  generally  work  on  the basis  of a preliminary  design  supplied  by the
road  administration.  For  the project's  execution,  the contract  between  the government
and  the  concession  company  is frequently  drafted  to allow  the concession  company
to introduce  innovative  ideas.  A  motorway  concession  project is  necessarily
evolutive.  The final characteristics  (such as pavement  thickness)  can be  achieved
progressively  in order to reduce initial investment,  as demonstrated  by the concession
company  Cofiroute  in  France.
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Respective  roles  of the state  and concession  company
4  CQNOESSI!ONAIR
STATE  S  X,gr  #  S3  '  rcoceson
,S,ti  t  72  7  t ti E  TAT  .l  ,  M=S'.'.y,.SS42MGREA.6  E  order
. |  sg  DSsS  ;EfE>09AS  :uSS  :t:$'  **g  06ing
*  ~~Land  pu  i  hass  i
Declaration  of public  utility  a  wa  r-
Order In council
Detail  studies  *
Selection  of 300  m band
(Ministerial  decision)
300mbandstu4t9
Selection  of 1,000  m band  U
(Ministerial  decision)
1,000  m ban  tu
II.  6. SHARING  OF  RISKS  BE1WEEN  PUBLIC  AUTHORITIES  AND  CONCESSION  COMPANIES
11.6.1  Transfer  of risks in the case  of a toll concession
The  risk-sharing structure  is  clearly  identified  by  national  road
administrations  as being essential  to the concession  contract. But here again,
the notion of risk and the actual risk sharing practised between concession
companies  and public  authorities  vary significantly  from one country  to another.
Based on the national road administrations'  replies to the questionnaire,  we
generally  observe  that not all risks are the same  and therefore  must not be borne
by  the same  entity. This theory  is relatively  clear: a risk  should  be carried  by the entity
best suited to do so.  The ability to control a risk signifies the possession  of
adequate  structural tools for reducing the costs associated  with carrying this
risk. Care must be taken to ensure  that an entity carrying  a given risk possesses  the
incentive  to do so.  If the public  authority  seeks  to persuade  concession  companies  to
take certain risks which they are unable  to control, this will prolong negotiations  and
increase  the level of remuneration  demanded  by the investors. If, on the other hand,
the concession  company  seeks to disengage  itself from purely technical  or principally
commercial  or financial risks at the expense of the government,  the utility of the
concession  should  then be re-examined.  The transfer  of risk  from  the public  authority  to
the concession  company  enhances  productive  efficiency.
In practice,  the sharing  of risks  raises  a number  of difficulties.  It is not always
easy  to determine  to what extent  an entity  is capable  of controlling  the risks  concerned.  In
general,  the entity  should not bear  exogenous  costs (those  over which it does not have
genuine  control).
It is appropriate  at this point to note the problem  of the growing  mesh of
motorway  networks,  which is making  it difficult  to attribute  commercial  risk.  The
34growing interrelationship between motorway sections under concession with the  same
network makes it increasingly  difficult  for the commercial  risk to be borne by the concession
companies alone, due to the fact that traffic levels can vary substantially according to
commercial  policies. Consequently,  the public authorities are increasingly having to
play a regulatory role, in particular by providing coordination between the various
concession companies.
Finally,  risks  are  shared  not  only  between  the  public  authorities  and
concession companies, but  also  with  the  public works  contractors, operating
companies, financiers and insurers (this illustrates the  complexity of  a  concession
package where a  number of players are concerned).  Four categories of  risk can be
encountered  in a concession  system:
. Political and  legal risks.  These  risks are  borne by  the  government  (with
guarantees where necessary) and particularly concern three domains: i)  natural
phenomena,  force majeure,  war or civil disturbance;  (ii) legislative  changes; and (iii)
changes in government policy, namely changes in regulatory conditions, or the
inability of the government  to meet its contractual  obligations. Even though it is not
applied to the western European countries, it should be mentioned that there is a
guarantee programme set up by the World Bank to cover both the risks that the
financial market cannot bear (except by increasing the project costs substantially)
and the government's obligations as expressed in the concession contract.  The
main characteristics  of this guarantee are described in the box below.
World Bank partial risk guarantee  programme
This guarantee  programme,  which  is appropriate  for the funding  of projects  such as
those involving  a concession  contract,  covers  the obligations  of the government  as
expressed  in its agreement  with the private  investor  (such  as a concession  company)
This  guarantee  makes  it possible  to ensure  payment  of the debt  to lenders,  in the event  tha
payment  default  results  from the government's  non-compliance  with its obligations.  In the
concession  domain, the government's  obligations  in  question typically includ
maintenance  of the toll charges  mentioned  in the concession  contract,  obligation
relating  to a minimum  traffic  threshold,  and  risks  associated  with  monetary  conversio
(time  scale,  degradation  of macro-economic  conditions,  legislative  changes  linked  t
exchange  rates,  etc.). It should  be noted  that this programme  does not aim to cover  th
commercial  risk,  but merely  to ensure  compliance  with  the obligations  of the public  authoritie
as set out in the contract. This guarantee  programme  has already  been introduced  for z
number  of power  station  projects  in Pakistan  and  there  is apparently  discussion  of extendins
them  to projects  in  Columbia  and  Poland
*  Technical  risks.  These are construction-related  risks (completion and completion
dates, quality, cost of postponement  and modification). These risks are borne by the
concession  company  and/or the construction  and/or operating  companies.
*  Commercial risks.  Commercial risks occur due to uncertainties regarding traffic
levels.  Commercial  risks, defined as the product of toll charge x traffic, are usually
regarded as the responsibility  of the concession company.  However, experience
35shows that these risks, particularly  for new motorways,  can be too great to be borne
by the concession company alone.  Traffic levels must be analysed with care and
predictions  must be realistic. There is a clear relationship  between  the establishment
of toll charges,  the degree of competition  (which can be set by the government), and
risks associated  with concession  company  revenue.
. Economic and  financial risks.  These risks emanate from  uncertainties
concerning economic growth, inflation rates, the  convertibility of  currencies and
exchange rates. They are carried by the concession  company and the banks.
The following table illustrates the typology of  risk sharing in  Europe's motorway
concessions.  This table is restrictive in that it only takes one type of risk sharing into
account per country, where in reality the situation  can change for each concession project.
However, this table demonstrates the particular risk sharing position involved with a
shadow toll system (which is addressed in detail in section 11.6.2),  emphasising the
specific cases of Norway and the Netherlands, insofar as technical risks in these
countries  are borne by the concession  authority,  not the concession company.
Analysis of risk sharing for road concession contracts in Europe
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11.6.2  Transfer  of risks in a shadow toll system
The logic upon which DBFO systems are based is not essentially financial.  The
primary objective is to  transfer certain risks normally borne by the  government to  the
concession  company,  so that they are borne by the entity (concession  authority or company)
best fitted to bear each particular  risk. A direct consequence  of this is that construction,
maintenance  and operating risks are borne exclusively by the concession company.
For example, penalties are automatically  applied for defective maintenance or if lanes are
closed for an excessive length of time during the execution of repair work.  On the other
hand, the commercial  risk (toll income x traffic) is shared. If the traffic level observed is
greater than estimated by the concession  company, the latter receives a remuneration  (paid
by the concession  authority) in excess of what was planned,  subject to a capping threshold.
Example  of public/private  partnership  for the construction  of tunnels  in the Netherlands
36The Dutch  Government  has set up private project  funding  schemes  for the construction  of tw
tunnels, with the goal of building  more tunnels  than possible  through  budget funding  only.  I
service  since 1992,  the "Noord"  tunnel replaced  an existing  bridge  on a main highway  between
Rotterdam  and the Ruhr in Germany  and  was the first  for which  a private  funding  was planned.
Much  attention  was paid  to relations  between  the private  investor  and the Rijkswaterstaat  (publi
works department  of the Dutch Ministry  for Transport  and Public Works), who managed  thE
project  and is now responsible  for maintaining  and operating  the tunnel on behalf of the privatE
investor,  ensuring compliance  with national infrastructure  quality standards. The risk sharinc
between  the investor  and the government  was essential  because  the Dutch  private sector  hac
no previous  experience  with public/private  partnerships. It was therefore  necessary  to establist
a risk profile  to enable the investor  to assess  its commitments.  The objective  was to limit the
risk relating  to total cost  for the investor  by setting  a maximum  amount  for maintenance
and operation  over a thirty year period, which means that increases  in construction,
maintenance  and operating  costs will be borne by the government  and the investor's
remuneration  depends  on  the tunnel  utilization  which  is the investor's  main risk.
Source:  Netherlands  contribution  to DERD/WERD,  May 1996, for the report on "Road Funding  and
Organisation  of European  Road  Administrations".
11.7  ROLE  OF  THE CONCESSION  AUTHORITY
The advantage of a toll concession arrangement is that it constitutes one of the
best ways to  raise and allocate funding sources, not only for  motorway construction
work, but also for maintenance and operation. This allocation of sources to the highway
system  generates  a  debudgetisation effect,  which  does  not mean that  the  public
authorities have no part to play.  Their task is to safeguard the  interests of the
community (environment,  safety, etc.), provide any additional funding as required,
and carry certain risks which cannot  be borne by the private  sector.
11.7.1  Financial  support
Mixed project financing  is extremely  frequent,  since the traffic level required  to fund
both operation and  construction is high.  An  analysis of the  replies to  the  European
motorway concession practice questionnaire  clearly indicates  that the governments provide
strong  financial  support for concession  arrangements.
Government assistance  for a concession is legitimate  insofar as the economic utility
of a project is generally  greater than its return on equity. The development  of infrastructures
is a positive source of external benefits (time saving, stimulation of growth, etc.), which
create a disparity between return on equity and socio-economic return.  A  concession
contract involves  two periods. During  the first period,  the concession  company incurs losses
and can pay no dividend, but the second  period can be profitable. Support  from the public
sector is consequently important, particularly during the start-up phase, when it is
sometimes  difficult  to survive cash-flow  crises, making it a particularly  fragile period.
Financial  support from the public  authorities  can take various  forms:
*  financial  guarantees;
37*  provision  of land  or equipment;
. repayable advances (enable  concession company to  cope  with  the  financial
expense of borrowing during construction  period until start of operational period and
the early operational  phase as well);
*  allocation of revenue  from an already operational  concessioned  infrastructure;
*  participating capital loans (as in Spain, see box below);
*  execution  of improvements  to facilitate access  to the concessioned  facility.
Public authority financial support for the concession sector in Spain
Government  aid procedures  in force  at the present  time in Spain  are as follows:
. Repayable advances:  the state advan'est 'a; gtivenf  'sum which must be subsequently
reimbursed by the concession 'company.:
. Participating capital  loa.ns:sumsdvan'edby  tegrnm  forthe  construction  of the
motorway  that must be rimrsed  by  theloncssion  copany  in  accordance  with a pre-
established  schedule  (defind  in the specifications,  o.rcoveredbya  bid and consequently
stipulated  in thet  contrt)  Thischdle  ind  detisogovernment  reimbursement  by
the concession  company  on thebasis of specific  traffic conditions  (for example,  payment  of a
given  sum according  to the  traffic  level, provided  this exs  a certain threshold).
11.7.2  Watchdog  for the interests of the community
The  public authorities also  have  a  role  to  play  in  terms  of  protecting the
environment and the safety and services provided for  road users.  This  is  only
achieved if it is clearly set out in the specifications and if the concession is regularly
monitored by the concession  authority. The government  must also carefully integrate
the motorway  concession  system in the global national  road network, taking account
of priorities  in terms of national  development  and improvements.
The following graph identifies the main objectives of the concession authority and
concession  company  that are linked  by a concession  contract.
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11.7.3  Risk  coverage
The  role  of the  public  authorities  must  be to  reduce  risk  by  1) introducing  clear,
stable  regulatory  and  tax  frameworks  and  2)  balancing  the  contract  to  avoid  imposing
excessive  charges  on the concession  company  (tax, exorbitant  concession  fee, etc.).
Ill.  SUMMARY
111.1  SUMMARY  OF  ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE  CONCESSION  PRACTICES: DIFFERENCES  AND
SIMILARITIES  BETWEEN  EUROPEAN  COUNTRIES
The  first  point  is  that  a  wealth  of  experience  exists  in  Europe  in  the  area  of
motorway  concessions:  In  1999, out of a total of 51,242  km of motorway,  17,009  km
were  concessioned  (33%),  of which  16,356  km were  tolled  and 653  km were  under
shadow  toll.  European  experience  in motorway  concessions  is recognised  world-wide.
This  wealth  of  experience  should  not  hide  the  diversity  of  the  systems
introduced  by  the  various  countries.  Concession  systems  differ  in  terms  of  the
respective  roles of the concession  company  and the public  authorities.  For example,  we
have shown  that  concession  companies  in  Norway  and  the  Netherlands  have  terms  of
reference  which  differ  substantially  from  those  in other  European  countries.  Differences
from  one country  to  another  are also encountered,  to a lesser  degree,  in the  sharing  of
risks  between  the  concession  authority  and  the  concession  company.  This
question  of  risk  sharing  represents  one  of  the  major  difficulties  for  road
administrations  when  setting  up  concession  projects.  The  increasingly  dense
motorway  network  is  also  generating  difficulties  in  commercial  risk  attribution.
The  increasing  degree  of  interrelationship  between  motorway  sections  under
concession  within  the  same  network  is  making  it  more  and  more  difficult  for  the
concession  companies  alone  to  carry  the  commercial  risk,  since  traffic  levels  can  vary
considerably  according  to  commercial  policies  that  are  defined  on  an  individual  basis.
Consequently,  the  public  authorities  will  progressively  be  required  to  play  a
39greater regulatory role. Moreover some bad experiences make the private sector
reluctant to bear the commercial risk.
Formulas for determining toll charges also differ throughout Europe ("price
cap" method  in Italy,  traffic band method  in the United Kingdom,  etc.).  Each of these
formulas corresponds  to  a particular level of risk sharing, and is  consequently of
genuine  interest  for all concession  authorities.
There are also differences  with respect to concession  company  selection
criteria.  In 1999, the main criteria used were: the amount of the public subsidy
required, the credibility of the financial arrangement, the technical quality  of the
project, operating strategy and price policy, and the reputation of the concession
company (inclusion  of a construction  company  amongst  its shareholders,  etc.).
It also appears  that  out of a total of 17,009  km of motorway under concession,
12,461 km are  managed by  the public sector  (73%)" and 4,548 km by  private
companies (27%).  There are currently 63 state-owned  and 28 private concession
companies in  Europe.  This  prominent  position  occupied  by  state-owned
companies in motorway concessions in Europe should be kept in mind.
While the functions  of toll systems  are both numerous  and diverse  (channelling  of
demand,  regulation,  funding,  internalisation  of external  effects,  etc.) it appears  that road
administrations  are increasingly  confronted  with  the problem of the social acceptability of
road  tolls.  This depends  on five main  factors,  namely  the amount  of the toll, collection
method,  enhancement  of user  service,  presence  of free alternative  routes,  and the possible
existence  of taxes  already  allocated  to the road  sector.
The following  graph situates concessions with  respect to other types  of
funding used in Europe (budget, private interim funding,  etc.) according to two
criteria: payment by the user or taxpayer and the sharing of commercial  risks.  Two
principal  conclusions  can be drawn:
*  the main criteria used to characterise a road infrastructure concession are
the  globality  of  the  contract,  and  the  sharing  of  risks  between  the
concession authority and the concession company.  A  concession  is of
interest  to  the  public  authorities  insofar  as  the  concession  company
assumes  global  responsibility  for  the  investment  and  its  subsequent
management, and a genuine transfer of risks to the concession company
occurs.  Indeed,  the fact that operating expenses are just as substantial as
construction  costs  is frequently overlooked.  On average, operating costs
reach  about  75%  of construction  costs  after  a normal  35 year  concession  period);
. there is a borderline zone in the definition  of a concession  (shown pale-
green in the following  diagram)  where there is no real consensus concerning
Autostrade, the major Italian concessionaire has been privatized in 2000.
40the nature  of contracts  (for  example,  a shadow  toll contract  involving  substantial
limitation  of the risks carried  by the concession  company).
Furthermore,  it is important  to draw  attention  to the problem  of the assumption  of
commercial  risk  (toll  charge  x traffic)  in a concession  context.  In contrast  to a simple  work
contract,  the  concession  company  selected  by  the government  bears  the financial  cost  of
the investment  and carries  the greater  part of the commercial  risk. Nevertheless,  this
commercial  risk  is too great  in certain  instances  to be carried  by the concession
company  alone.  This is the case in particular  where the project is integrated  in a
meshed  motorway  network.  In this  situation,  any  change  in price  policy  for any part  of the
network,  no matter how remote  from the project  under concession,  can have major
consequences  on the  traffic  levels  recorded  in the later  stages. The level  of uncertainty
concerning  traffic  predictions  for new  toll infrastructures  is generally  high,  increasing  with
the length  of the concession  period  (usually  around  30  years). It is therefore  advisable,
as suggested  in Chapter  II, to control  the commercial  risk  by means  of mechanisms
incorporated  in the contract  between  the concession  authority  and concession
company  (capping  the amount of toll revenue collected by the concession
company,  controlling  the rate of return  of the concession  company,  etc.), or to
apply a variable  concession  period. Control  of the commercial  risk must not,
however,  lead  to  the  elimination  ofany  incentive  in  this  field.
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111.2  ROLE OF CONCESSION  AUTHORITIES
Concession  authorities  essentially  safeguard  the interests  of the general public,
while introducing  incentive  mechanisms  for the concession  companies.
41The  increasingly frequent recourse to  private funding for  the  execution of
motorway concession projects must not lead to  government withdrawal from the
management  of road systems. This study has demonstrated  the importance  of the
role of concession  authorities  in the successful  implementation  of concession
projects,  whether  upstream  (project  identification,  socio-economic  studies  to measure  the
interest  of the project  for the  community)  or downstream  (drafting  specifications,  negotiating
with the  candidate concession  company, and monitoring  the concession up to  its
termination).  It is also  important  to remember  that it is only  the  socio-economic  return  of
a project  that provides  a relevant  indicator  of the advantage  of an investment  for the
community.
The feasibility of a concession  can be quantified  on the basis  of the following
three  factors:
- the  funding constraint  that restrict the possibility  for achieving economically
profitable  investments;
- the allocation  of resources  collected  from  the user  rather  than the  taxpayer,  which
leads  to a preference  for investments  that can be funded  to the detriment  of other
solutions  that are more advantageous  in terms of the economic  results for the
community,  but  which  ensure  their  feasibility:
- the  toll  dissuasion effect, which reduces the  economic advantage of  the
development  programme.
The increasingly  frequent  use of private  funding  must  be taken into  account
when defining  the training required  by the personnel  responsible  for monitoring
the concessions. The financial and legal aspects have now taken on enough
importance  that they must form a genuine part of the basic knowledge  of concession
authority  personnel.
Finally, it should not be forgotten  that in addition  to its task of safeguarding  the
interests  of the community,  the concession  authority (government)  must also concern
itself  with increasing  the awareness  of citizens,  whether  or not they are users. In order
to ensure the social acceptability  of their  decisions,  it is of primary  importance  (both for
implementation  of the "user-payer"  principle and for the conclusion  of a concession
contract  for a project  with  the private  sector)  that authorities  take great  care  to inform  the
public beforehand  of the reasons  for their choice. This has the added advantage of
establishing  a transparent  environment  while associating  the public with government
decisions  to a significant  degree.
42APPENDIX*
EC  LEGISLATION  RELATING  TO  CONCESSIONS
Before  examining  EC legislation  applicable  to concessions,  it is important  to note
the EC definition  of a concession  in terms of public works concessions  and service
concessions.
EC  APPROACH  TO INFRASTRUCTURE  CONCESSIONS  (WORK  AND SERVICES)
Public works concessions
The European  Commission  defines a public works concession  in article ld  of
directive 931371EC:  "a  public works concession is  a  contract having the  same
characteristics  as a public  works contract,  except  that the consideration  for the work
comprises  the right to exploit the facility only, or this right accompanied  by a
price". In this way, the directive  defines  a concession,  to some  extent,  as a variation  of
a government  contract  rather than a separate  type of contract,  with the distinguishing
element  being  the substitution  of the right  to exploit  the  facility  constructed  or developed
by the  contractor for the  price set by the  award procedure and payable by  the
adjudicating  authority  to the  contractor,. 1 2
Two  criteria  are intrinsically  linked  to the notion  of public  works concession:
z  the consideration  for execution of the work is the right to exploit the
facility  concerned. This is the equivalent  of saying  that a concession  contract
must  include  an "operation  of the facility"  part  which is subject  to remuneration;
z  a concession  contract  implies  the need for a transfer  of responsibility  (namely
the transfer  of risk) from the concession  authority to the concession  company.
The latter must be responsible  for management  of the service  concerned,  which
in this case  is the operation  of a motorway.
Service concessions
The decisive  criterion  adopted  by the European  Commission  to distinguish  public
works concessions  from service  concessions  is whether or not the contract  covers  the
construction  of a facility for and on behalf of the concession  authority.  Thus, any
contract covering  the operation  of an existing  infrastructure  corresponds  to a service
concession.
EC REGULATIONS  APPLICABLE  TO INFRASTRUCTURE  CONCESSIONS
* This appendix is based on EU legislation  as of 1999.
12 See "Point of view of EC authorities regarding  delegated management", J.L. Dewost, Director General of
the EC Legal Department, Conference on "Delegated public service management", 14-15 November 1996.
43The award of a concession  is mainly  subject  to the rules and principles  of the
EC Treaty  and directive  93137/EC.  Neither  directive  92150/EC  relating  to public service
contracts,  nor directive  93/38/EC  relating  to contracts  issued  by entities  operating  in the
water,  energy, transport and  telecommunications  sectors, contains any  specific
measures relating to the award of concessions. The EC white paper on public
procurement  in European  Union  (COM  98 (143)  of 1110311998)and  the Commission
interpretative communication  on  concessions under Community law  dated
29/04/2000,  throw further light on the applicable  regulations  by clarifying  the European
Commission's recommendations  for the application of  rules of  fair competition to
projects covering  new transport infrastructures,  as well as EC jurisprudence  on this
subject.
Rules  and  principles  of the EC Treaty
The following  articles of the EC Treaty must be known to public administrations
awarding  infrastructure  concessions:
*  article 12 (paragraph 1)  prohibits any discrimination  on the  basis of
nationality;
*  articles 39, 40,43 and 49 relate to discrimination  based on nationality.  Any
regional  or national  preference  is prohibited  by these articles. The principle
of equal opportunity  for all candidates  with respect to the  award of  a
concession  must  be  followed  under  all circumstances;
X  article  82 relates  to the behaviour  of a company  holding  a dominant  position;
,  article 86 relates to undertakings  entrusted withthe operation of services of
general  economic  interest;
*  articles 87  and 88 relate to government  aid.  Subsidies granted by public
authorities  to concession  companies,  whether the latter are state-controlled  or
private,  are liable  to fall foul of the principle  of incompatibility  of such aid with the
Common  Market insofar  as they affect intra-community  trade and are liable to
distort  competition. 13
Council  directive  93/37/EC  of 14  June 1993  ("public  works  directive")
This directive makes the award of motorway concessions  subject to the
obligation  of prior publication. Once  this obligation  has been met, in accordance
with prescribed  procedures,  the bids  submitted  can be  freely negotiated.
The contracts targeted by the "public works directive" are  those with the
following  characteristics:
13 See "Point of view of EC authorities regarding delegated management",  J.L. Dewost, Director General of
the EC Legal Department, Conference on "Delegated public service management" 14-15 November 1996.
44- the amount of the contract  must be 5 million ECU or more (excluding  VAT).
The equivalent  value  of the this amount  in national  currencies  is revised  every 24
months  from 1 January  1993  (article  3 of directive  93/37),
- the  purpose of  the  contract is  the  execution and/or design of  work
involving  the following  professional  activities:  building,  civil engineering,
installation,  improvement  and completion,  namely the construction  of a
facility, by  whatever means that  meets the  needs stipulated by  the
adjudicating  authority  (article  1, paragraph  a of directive  93/37),
- the contract  is one which the state or its government  departments,  other
than those of an industrial  or commercial  character,  proposes  to conclude,
where the remuneration  of the contractor  consists,  in all or in part, of the
right  to operate  the facility  (article  1, paragraph  d of directive  93/37).
The obligation  is to make the intention  to award a concession  known by
means  of an announcement.  The adjudicating  authorities  are obliged  to open  the
contract to  competition at  the  European level by  publishing a  concession
announcement  in the form specified in the  Official Journal of the  European
Communities  (OJEC),  directive  93/37/EC. This announcement  must not exceed one
page of the OJEC, or approximately  650 words. The model public works concession
announcement  provided in Appendix 5 to directive 93137/EC  is  reproduced in the
following  box. Publication  expenses  are borne  by the European  Community. The time
allowed  for submission  of bid applications  may not  be less than 52 days from the
date of transmission  of the announcement  to the OPOEC (Official Publications
Office of the European  Communities). This measure applies whether the potential
concession  company  is state-owned  or private.
The selection  procedure  for the concession  company  is free (with  the concession
authority  engaging  in a negotiated  procedure).
Model  public  works  concession  announcement
1. Name,  address,  telephone,  telex  and  fax  numbers  of the  adjudicating  authority.
2. a) Place  of execution.
b) Purpose  of the  concession:  nature  and  extent  of the  services.
3. a) Deadline  date  for submission  of bid  applications.
b)  Address  to which  applications  are  to be  sent.
c) Language(s)  in  which  applications  are  to be  drafted.
4. Personal,  technical  and  financial  conditions  to be  met  by  applicants.
5. Criteria  to be used  for  award  of the  contract.
3-6.  Minimum  percentage  of sub-contracted  work,  where  appropriate.
4.7.  Other  information.
6$.8.  Date  of issue  of  the  announcement.
6,9.  Date  of reception  of the  announcement  by  the  OPOEC.
45Source:  OJEC  No. Li 99181,  Appendix  V to directive  93137/EC
The types of contract concerned  are those "where  the remuneration  of the
contractor comprises, in  all  or  in  part, the  right to  operate the  facility", namely
concessions, lease and similar contracts,  even if  part of the  remuneration is
represented  by a price  paid by the state-owned  or semi-public  entity.  This only applies
to  contracts concerning the execution of "any building or  civil engineering work",
although  these rules  are not applicable  to the excluded  sectors.
Contracts  issued  in turn by concession  companies  are therefore  subject,  to
advance  announcement  prior  to their issue. Exceptions  to this rule of mandatory
announcement  are made for contracts  signed  between  a consortium  formed to obtain
the concession  and members  of the consortium  or affiliate  companies. The expression
"laffiliate companies" covers companies under the  dominant influence of  another
company,  this influence  being  assumed  in the case of majority  voting or capital control,
or clauses  providing  for appointment  of more  than half of the management,  supervisory
or governing  body. There  is no prior  announcement  obligation  in four cases:
- 1) where the work can only be contracted  out to a single sub-contractor,  for
technical  or artistic  reasons,  or reasons  relating  to protection  of exclusivity  rights,
- 2) in the event of absolute  urgency  that is incompatible  with the time required  for
prior announcement  and is outside of the control of the entity intending to
conclude  the contract,
- 3) in the case of additional  work, where aggregate  contracts  for additional  work
may not  exceed  50%  of the amount  of the main  contract,
- 4) in the case of work involving  the repetition  of similar  work already executed.
The new work in this case must nevertheless  conform  to the basic project, and
the contract procedure  must be initiated  within three years.  The first contract
must also have been issued  following an open or restricted  procedure,  and the
possibility  of an extension  must  have  been indicated  in  the initial  call for tenders.
The  specific  problem  of backing  by collateral.  It is not  always  possible  to cover
the construction  and operating  costs  of a motorway  from toll revenue  when traffic levels
are low or costs are abnormally  high.  Furthermore,  in all European  countries  where toll
systems  are used  to fund road  projects,  initial  public  support  has been necessary  for the
development  of the motorway  system. This support has frequently  taken the form of
equalisation  between  the resources  of existing  and new motorway  sections. This raises
the problem,  at the EC level,  of backing  by collateral  (frequently  confused  with the
extension  of concession  periods),  namely  the utilisation  of toll revenue  from amortised
motorways  to fund new  sections. This backing  method  is used  in a number  of European
countries. However,  this method  should  be employed  with caution. Backing,  which
can be envisaged  where projects  are not financially  profitable  during  the period of the
concession,  must be made compatible  with certain EC principles,  such as equal
opportunities  for all candidates  in a call  for tenders.  Finally,  backing  by extension  of a
46concession  contract  may constitute  a hidden  subsidy,  and as such, is a practice  that
may  be incompatible  with rules  concerning  governmental  aid.
The issue of a European  legislation  in the area of concession  in currently the
subject  of numerous  discussions  in Europe
Subsidised  concessions
As we have  seen, the funding  scheme  for an infrastructure  concession  generally
involves government aid. 14 A  concession  involves  two phases: during the first, the
concession  company  experiences  losses,  and  cannot  pay any dividend,  whereas  profit  can
be generated  during  the second  phase. Government  aid to a private  concession  is
legitimate,  insofar  as the economic  utility  of a project  is generally  greater  than its
return  on equity. This type of mixed  funding,  namely  in the form of a public-private
partnership,  is  extremely  frequent because  the  traffic levels required to  fund  both
construction  and  operation  are high.
Backing  and backing-extension:  funding  road  infrastructures  which are profitable
in socio-economic  terms  but not financially  balanced
In numerous  European  countries  that use toll concession  systems,  backing
and backing-extension  methods  have been used in the past for the extension  of
existing  motorway  networks.
For example,  in France,  until  year 2000,  backing  a new motorway  section  with an
existing  concession  has been accompanied  by extending  the global concession  period
in order  to achieve  a financially  balanced  situation  for the new, combined  entity.
In Spain, concessions have been extended in exchange for  new motorway
construction,  and on occasion,  to offset reduced  toll charges  as well.  The maximum
concession  period was extended from 50 to 75 years by the law of 30/12/1996, in
exchange  for a reduction  in toll charges  to the "European  mean"  of about  (0.06/km.
14 Funding without recourse to such aid is very rarely observed in road infrastructure project funding.
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